Keeping Secrets on Social Media: Part II

Employees telling secrets online was the subject of yesterday’s post, Keeping Secrets on Social Media.  Today’s post–a continuation of the theme from yesterday–is about “auto-expire” apps.

telling secrets_thumb

An “auto-expire” app is an app that enables users to set an automatic expiration date and time for social-media or other online content.  There are lots of reasons one would use an auto-expire app but the three that come immediately to mind are regret, efficiency, and secrecy.

Social-media regret is nothing new.  Just last summer, I wrote a post about social-media regret syndrome.  Auto-expire apps like Xpire, for example, allow users to set expiring posts for Facebook, Twitter, and Tumbler.

Efficiency also is a reason to consider these apps. You don’t need to keep (or have others keep) the series of text messages exchanged about where to meet for lunch.

But secrecy, in my opinion, is the most prominent reason for the increased interest in these auto-expire apps.  In the employment context, there may be security reasons for having highly confidential discussions automatically deleted forever.  Apps like Wickr (branded as “a top-secret messenger), are targeted to businesses for exactly that reason.  Wickr advertises that messages sent through the app contain no geolocation data and are not tracked or monitored–what’s yours is yours and cannot be accessed by the host site.

Be careful, though, about what you send through these apps–people are often surprised by the utility of having access to evidence in the form of contemporaneous posts and conversations.  But, for certain exchanges, you can imagine the equally powerful utility of having an untraceable and permanently deleted line of communications.

Keeping Secrets on Social Media

The title of this post is a bit laughable, isn’t it?  I mean, really, it’s almost an oxymoron.  Keeping secrets on social media?  What’s the point?  The very existence of social media is dependent upon sharing-not secret-keeping.  But the two are intersecting more and more.  Which is why I am writing a short series of posts about the topic.  Beginning today with a post about “anonymous” apps.telling secrets_thumb

Back in February, fellow employment lawyers, Adam S. Forman and Dan Schwartz, and I were interviewed for an article in Law360, titled, “What Employers Need to Know About the New Social Media.”  In that article, I discussed what I think is the wave of the future in social media for employers-apps focused on secrecy.

For example, one app, Secret, allows users to share anonymous messages with anyon3e in their contacts who also uses the app.  Employers in the tech industry, where these apps are particularly popular, are struggling with how to deal with (and, preferably, prevent), the loss of confidential company information.

For example, an employee hears through the grapevine that the Vice-President of R & D has taken a job with a competing firm.  Employee posts that hot tidbit on Secret, where all of his work colleagues (who also have the app, of course), will see it.  The firm can be seriously disadvantaged by uncontrolled leaks of information.  And, when the app is designed specifically for that very purpose, it is hard to address with any meaningful result.

As a side note, educators are struggling with a related problem.  Students bullying other students via these anonymous apps is a serious problem that many school districts are trying to manage.

So what should employers be doing?  Well, to start, they should be reading this blog post.  If they do, at least they’ll know about the existence of these “anonymous” social-media apps and about the potential issues the employer may be facing already because of them.  Next, employers should consider investigating for themselves. Have an individual from HR subscribe to the service and see what, if anything, is posted about the company.  Although it may hurt to find out, it’s better that you know so you can make a rational decision about how, if at all, to address it.

In the next post in this series, I’ll discuss “auto-expire” apps that enable users to set an expiration date on their posts and messages.  Stay tuned.

How NOT to Produce Facebook Evidence

Electronic discovery, the collection and production of electronic documents in litigation, is a scary thing to many lawyers. Some are so scared by it, in fact, that they just deny that it exists and continue to produce only hard-copy documents. Of course, that is a terrible idea. And not at all in compliance with the rules of procedure. But, alas, it is what it is.logo_from_dev

There are times that a lawyer will want to produce electronic records, such as text messages, emails, and, heaven forbid, social-media content, but simply not know how to do it.  I had an opposing counsel call me once and say that he was willing to produce his client’s relevant Facebook posts if I would show him how to do it.  Ummmm, no.

My point, though, is that lawyers are ethically bound to understand and comply with the applicable e-discovery rules but, as a matter of practical reality, that does not mean that they comply.  Which is why e-discovery continues to be a predominant subject for discussion in the legal profession.

A recent case from South Carolina gives a pretty good example of how not to produce electronically stored information (ESI).  In Wellin v. Wellin, the defendants moved to compel the production of certain ESI, including emails, text messages, and Facebook posts in “native format.”  (Native format means, in the most basic sense, that if it was originally in electronic form, you must produce it in electronic form, as opposed to paper form).

The plaintiffs apparently had attempted to produce the requested items but, instead of producing the responsive material in native format, they . . . [wait for it, wait for it] . . . :

printed out responsive emails and provided photocopies of certain portions of those emails to defendants. Additionally, [one plaintiff] provided the content of several text message exchanges and Facebook posts by transcribing those messages on loose-leaf paper.

The Court granted the motion to compel.

Initially, I assumed that the producing parties must have been acting pro se (without counsel) because there is just no way that a lawyer would produce text messages and Facebook posts that were “transcribed” on “loose-leaf paper.”  Upon closer review of the opinion, though, it appears that all parties were represented.  Clearly, I am missing something about the course of events that led a party to produce ESI in this “format” (is loose-leaf paper even considered a “format”?).

What matters, though, is that employers and their counsel be diligent in their efforts to preserve all potentially relevant evidence, including text messages and social-media content, and to preserve it in its original form (native format).  Preservation is the first step.  Maybe we can work on our production skills after that.  I’ll keep my fingers crossed.

Wellin v. Wellin, No. 2:13-cv-1831-DCN, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95027 (D.S.C. July 14, 2014).

Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Via Facebook

Breaches of confidentiality via Facebook and other social media are more common than most of us would like to think.  Employees post information about customers, clients, and patients on Facebook, in violation of internal company policies and privacy laws, such as HIPAA, for example.  I recently wrote about a plaintiff who could not collect a sizeable settlement payment because his daughter posted about the settlement on Facebook, which served to demonstrate that her father had breached the confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement. logo_from_dev

There’s another reason to be concerned about what employees say on social-networking sites-waiver of the attorney-client privilege.  The general rule is that confidential communications between an attorney and her client are subject to the privilege and are not subject to discovery by the opposing side.  Privilege can be waived, however.  And one way for a client to waive privilege is to have the communication in the presence of a third party.  Another way is for the client to tell a third party about the communication between himself and his lawyer.

For example, Lawyer and Client meet to discuss strategy regarding litigation.  This conversation would be privileged.  If Client brings his friend to the meeting, the conversation would not be privileged.  And, if Client did not bring his friend but reported the conversation to his friend after the meeting was over, the privilege would be lost.

Communicating an otherwise privileged conversation via Facebook is no different than if done via telephone or in person.  A case decided earlier this week in a federal court in Nebraska reminds us of this risk.  In Kaiser v. Gallup, Inc., the employee-plaintiff filed suit under the ADA against her former employer.  During discovery, the employer learned that the plaintiff had communicated with her cousin, who was a lawyer, about events leading up to the plaintiff’s termination.  The employer also discovered that the plaintiff had discussed the  communications with her cousin (the lawyer) via Facebook.

The employer sought to compel the plaintiff to produce those communications.  In response, the plaintiff contended that they were protected by the attorney-client privilege because, at the time the communications were made, her cousin represented her as counsel in her unemployment-benefits claim.  The employer argued that, even if the privilege had once applied, the plaintiff waived it when she discussed the communications with third parties.  The plaintiff failed to show that she hadn’t waived the privilege and the court granted the employer’s motion.

This case, and others like it, serve as a good reminder that confidential information should not be shared through any medium, including social media.  Posting it to Facebook is, contrary to popular belief, the equivalent to sharing it on the phone, in an email, or in person.  If it’s a secret-it doesn’t belong on Facebook.

Kaiser v. Gallup, Inc., No. 8:13CV218, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92588 (D. Neb. July 8, 2014).

Facebook Post Means No Unemployment Benefits for Nurse

Joseph Talbot worked as a nurse at Desert View Care Center until he was terminated for violating the employer’s social-media policy. In the Facebook post that triggered his termination, Talbot wrote:

Ever have one of those days where you’d like to slap the ever loving bat snot out of a patient who is just being a jerk because they can? Nurses shouldn’t have to take abuse from you just because you are sick. In fact, it makes me less motivated to make sure your call light gets answered every time when I know that the minute I step into the room I’ll be greeted by a deluge of insults.

One of Talbot’s Facebook friends, a nursing professor, reported the post to the employer, expressing concerns about resident safety. Talbot said he was “just venting.” The employer fired him, citing the company’s social-media policy.

Talbot sought unemployment insurance benefits but his claim was denied b/c he was discharged for violating the company’s policy. Talbot appealed and the Appeals Examiner reversed the initial denial decision, finding that he had not been terminated for employment-related misconduct. The employer appealed and the decision was reversed and Talbot was denied unemployment benefits. Talbot appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court.

The high court upheld the denial of benefits, finding that the employer had satisfied each of the three required elements. Most import was the court’s finding that the employer had an expectation that its nurses would not make threatening statements about a patient on Facebook and that Talbot failed to meet the employer’s expectations. Talbot argued that his post was not a threat-it was merely a “rhetorical statement meant to initiate discussion.”

But this argument misses the point. The employer did not claim that Talbot’s post was an actual threat-only that it was “threatening.” There is a difference, it seems to me. “Threatening” language or comments can cause harm, regardless of intent. Personally, if I had a family member who was a patient at Desert View Care Center, I would have had significant reservations about the quality of care they would receive from Talbot. I wouldn’t necessarily think he had made a “threat”-only that his attitude was less than ideal for a caregiver. And the nursing professor who reported the post, apparently, thought so, too.

This is consistent with the First Amendment case law in the context of social-media and Free Speech. When an employer is faced with potential harms arising from an employee’s social-media post, the employer need not wait until those harms actually occur before taking action. Here, Desert Care was not required to wait until Talbot actually neglected a patient who, in Talbot’s opinion, complained too much. The employer can (and should) take action to ensure that the harms do not occur in the first instance.

Was this a tough break for Talbot? Maybe. But would it have been a really tough break for Desert Care if word got around that its nurses gave less attention to patients they didn’t like? Most definitely. And, especially in the health-care context, it’s not merely the employer’s prerogative to prevent bad outcomes but its duty.

For a different take on this case, see Eric Goldman’s Technology & Marketing Law Blog

Talbot v. Desert View Care Ctr., No. 41208 (Idaho, June 20, 2014).

Jurors Behaving Badly

Jurors misbehaving have been making a lot of news headlines lately.  And jurors’ online research is one of the most commonly reported problems in this area.judge's gavel_thumb

In May 2014, for example, a jury awarded the plaintiff, a former police officer, $300,000 in compensatory damages and $7.2 million in punitive damages based on its finding of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation.  The employer appealed the judgment after a juror acknowledged that, during deliberations, he Googled the phrase, “where do punitive damages go” and, after reading a Wikipedia entry on the subject, told his fellow jurors that the plaintiff would receive some or all of such an award.

Delaware has not been immune from this problem.  In May, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a final judgment following a jury verdict due to alleged juror misconduct.  In Baird v. Owczark, the plaintiff moved for a new trial on several grounds, including juror misconduct.  In the two weeks after the jury had delivered its verdict, one of the jurors wrote a letter to the trial judge informing him that another juror had conducted online research during deliberations.

The court heard oral argument about the alleged misconduct but did not conduct an investigation.  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the Delaware Constitution mandates an investigation following allegations of juror misconduct.  Such an investigation is mandatory even where the trial court gave clear instructions regarding the use of the Internet as a source of extrinsic information.

Baird v. Owczark, No. 504 (Del. May 28, 2014).

See also

Peek-a-Boo, I See You: Juror Contact Via LinkedIn

3d Cir. “Likes” Jury Instructions on Social Media

Calling Your Students “Hoes” Can (And Should) Get You Fired

During the 2007-2008 school year, Ms. Kimble was employed as a cook and cheerleading coach at a high school.  In December 2007, she took the cheerleaders on an overnight Christmas party held in a cabin located outside the county.  The trip was not approved as was required by district policy.  When administration learned about the trip, Ms. Kimble was instructed that all future out-of-county trips must have prior approval. Continue reading